






Epistemic states of uncertainty play important roles in ethical and political theorizing.
Theories that appeal to a “veil of ignorance,” for example, analyze fairness or impartial-
ity in terms of certain states of ignorance. It is important, then, to scrutinize proposed
conceptions of ignorance and explore promising alternatives in such contexts. Here, I
study Lerner’s probabilistic egalitarian theorem in the setting of imprecise probabilities.
Lerner’s theorem assumes that a social planner tasked with distributing income to indi-
viduals in a population is “completely ignorant” about which utility functions belong to
which individuals. Lerner models this ignorance with a certain uniform probability dis-
tribution, and shows that, under certain further assumptions, income should be equally
distributed. Much of the criticism of the relevance of Lerner’s result centers on the rep-
resentation of ignorance involved. Imprecise probabilities provide a general framework
for reasoning about various forms of uncertainty including, in particular, ignorance. To
what extent can Lerner’s conclusion be maintained in this setting?
Keywords. Distributive justice; egalitarianism; imprecise probabilities; Lerner’s theo-
rem; uncertainty; utilitarianism; veil of ignorance
1 Introduction
The veil of ignorance is an important theoretical construction for moral and political philos-
ophy. For Rawls, just arrangements of social institutions and general principles that govern
them are those that members of a society would choose under a hypothetical state of igno-
rance about the citizens’ individual social and economic standing, their abilities, etc. (Rawls,
1971). The idea is that such ignorance insulates choice from bias and unfair tailoring of poli-
cies to special interests. Similarly, in making his case for utilitarianism, Harsanyi assumes
that an agent choosing between social systems without knowing his or her position in them
is making a moral value judgment. On the question of the just distribution of income, he
writes, “a value judgment on the distribution of income would show the required imperson-
ality to the highest degree if the person who made this judgment had to choose a particular
income distribution in complete ignorance of what his own relative position (and the position
of those near to his heart) would be within the system chosen” (Harsanyi, 1953, pp. 434-435,
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emphasis mine). “This,” Harsanyi reflects later, “is my own version of the concept of the
‘original position’” (Harsanyi, 1975, p. 598).
Prior to either Harsanyi’s or Rawls’s invocation of some sort of original position, Abba
Lerner appealed to something of a conceptual forerunner of the veil of ignorance in the setting
of an interesting theorem concerning distributive justice (1946).1 Suppose that there is a fixed
sum of money to be distributed to individuals in a population. Importantly, Lerner stipulates,
the distribution must be chosen under ignorance as to who has which utility function. Given
Lerner’s particular formulation of ignorance and assumptions about individual and social
welfare, the equal distribution maximizes expected social welfare. If the goal is to maximize
expected social welfare, then Lerner provides an argument for an egalitarian distribution of
income.
Ignorance in the intended setting, according to Lerner, amounts to it being equally likely,
for any two people in the population, that one person possesses a given utility function as that
the other possesses it. Ignorance, in other words, is represented as all matchings of utility
functions to individuals being equally probable. Harsanyi conceives of ignorance along similar
lines. Continuing the passage quoted earlier, Harsanyi claims that an agent would choose
an income distribution “in complete ignorance” of his own relative position in society “if
he had exactly the same chance of obtaining the first position (corresponding to the highest
income) or the second or the third, etc., up to the last position (corresponding to the lowest
income) available within that scheme” (Harsanyi, 1953, p. 435, emphasis mine). This way of
thinking about ignorance has been regarded with a good deal of skepticism in general—being
in essence an application of the principle of indifference—and, as McManus et al. note, in
the context of Lerner’s theorem in particular: “Of particular interest in the past has been
Lerner’s assumption of complete ignorance about which individual has which utility function,
and his jump from that assumption to the hypothesis that each possible matching is equally
likely” (1972, p. 494). About the relevant probabilities, Graaff, for example, writes, “There
is no justification for assuming them equal. From absolute ignorance we can derive nothing
but absolute ignorance” (1957, p. 100 fn). Similarly, Little, remarking on Lerner’s theorem,
claims, “From complete ignorance nothing but complete ignorance can follow” (1950, p. 59).
How should we model ignorance in Lerner’s intended setting? Here, I consider Lerner’s
theorem in the setting of imprecise probabilities (IP). By the lights of many, IP allows for
a more general and compelling representation of uncertainty and of “complete ignorance”
in particular than standard probability models do (e.g., Keynes, 1921; Good, 1952; Levi,
1974; Walley, 1991; Kaplan, 1996; Joyce, 2011; Hájek and Smithson, 2012; Weatherson, 2015;
Stewart and Ojea Quintana, 2018; Hill, 2019). So it is interesting and natural, it would
seem, to consider arguments that appeal to some version of the veil of ignorance or related
ideas—as in Lerner’s theorem—in this more general setting. This allows us to perform a
robustness check of sorts. Lerner’s particular representation of ignorance, the equi-probability
assumption, constitutes a sticking point in the appreciation of his theorem, as we have just
seen. To what extent does his conclusion depend on this assumption? Some robustness
analysis has been performed, with theorems that establish the equal distribution of income
as optimal according to the maximin rule for decisions under ignorance (Theorem 2). But
1Paul Samuelson recasts Lerner’s theorem as an argument appealing more explicitly to a sort of veil of
ignorance (Samuelson, 1964, pp. 175–176). There are, of course, antecedent uses of related ideas. For some
of this historical background, see, for example, (Freeman, 2019, § 1).
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this rule is extremely conservative, moves decidedly away from the maximization of expected
utility, and is susceptible to certain intuitive counterexamples (e.g., Luce and Raiffa, 1957,
pp. 279–280).
After rehearsing the basics of the framework and stating a general version of Lerner’s the-
orem due to Sen in Section 2, I introduce and motivate IP as a framework for representing and
reasoning about uncertainty in Sections 3 and 4. The primary conceptual move is to employ
IP theory to model ignorance in the context of ethical arguments that exploit ignorance, e.g.,
veil of ignorance arguments or, in the case at hand, Lerner’s theorem.2 A crucial issue here is
that there are several candidate decision criteria for IP, each of which can claim to generalize
expected utility maximization. As a result, the admissibility of the egalitarian distribution
is a more subtle issue than in the standard setting. In the IP setting, we find that, from
the assumption of total ignorance, we do not automatically arrive at egalitarianism, partially
vindicating those skeptical of Lerner’s “jump” from complete ignorance to equal probability.
It depends, in part, on the IP generalization of expected utility that we adopt. But, pace
Little and Graaff, it is not true that we arrive at nothing from total ignorance. Even for
the most extreme form of ignorance in the IP setting, what we arrive at depends, again, on
the decision rule that we adopt. The admissibility of the equal distribution is fairly robust
for IP decision rules under complete ignorance (Observation 1). Moreover, certain properties
of social welfare that admit ethical motivation entail the unique admissibility of the equal
distribution under complete ignorance for some decision criteria (Observation 2). On the
other hand, certain intuitively very unjust distributions are likewise admissible for some of
the decision rules considered (Example 1). To the extent one finds the implied decision theory
compelling, this calls into question the inference from a distribution’s choiceworthiness under
ignorance to its status as fair or just.
2 (Sen’s Version of) Lerner’s Theorem
In presenting Lerner’s theorem, I follow Sen’s more general version (1973). Sen’s version of the
theorem generalizes away from the assumption that social welfare is additive or even separa-
ble, which already responds to certain objections to Lerner’s original formulation (Friedman,
1947). We assume that there is a group N of individuals, i = 1, . . . , n. We also assume that
there is a collection of n utility functions, U1, . . . , Un.3 It is unknown—and this is the cru-
cial point—which utility function is associated with which individual. Let y be any income
vector (y1, . . . , yn), with yi denoting the income of individual i. Let z be a vector of equal
incomes, zi = zj for all i, j ∈ N . A function of n arguments is called symmetric if the value
of the function is constant under permutations of the arguments. For income vectors, we say
2For related uses of IP theory, see (e.g., Levi, 1977; Gajdos and Kandil, 2008). Debates about appropriate
epistemic states (e.g., Buchak, 2017; Stefánsson, 2019) and decision-theoretic principles (e.g., Kurtulmuş,
2012; Liang, 2017; Gustafsson, 2018) behind the veil remain active. Stefánsson (2019), for example, considers
ambiguity averse preferences behind the veil, and finds such preferences support a form of egalitarianism. Liang
(2017), to take another example, employs cumulative prospect theory and finds an optimal form of inequality.
In contrast, the present paper considers a range of (purportedly normative) IP choice rules, focuses on Lerner’s
theorem rather than Rawls’s theory, makes no central appeal to objective probabilities, and seems to reach
relatively more equivocal conclusions about the extent to which a form of egalitarianism is or is not vindicated.
3Sen notes that the proofs to follow can be extended to cover larger, finite collections of utility functions.
Following Sen, I will use “utility” and “welfare” interchangeably for individuals.
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y = (y1, . . . , yn) ≥ y′ = (y′1, . . . , y′n) if yi ≥ y′i for all i ∈ N . A function f is increasing if y ≥ y′
implies f(y) ≥ f(y′). A function f : S → R defined on a convex subset of a real vector space
is called concave if for all x, y ∈ S and all λ ∈ [0, 1], f(λx+ (1− λ)y) ≥ λf(x) + (1− λ)f(y).
Standardly, concavity of individual utility is taken to reflect the rate at which the marginal
utility of income decreases and, in the context of decisions under uncertainty, risk aversion.
Concavity of a social welfare function, on the other hand, reflects a form of inequality aversion.
The assumptions for Sen’s generalization of Lerner’s theorem are as follows.
(A.1) (Total Income Fixity). There is a fixed sum y∗ to be distributed:
∑n
i=1 yi = y
∗.
(A.2) (Concavity of the Group Welfare Function). Social welfare W , an increasing and sym-
metric function of individual utilities, is concave.
(A.3) (Concavity of Individual Welfare Functions). Individual welfare functions are concave.
(A.4) (Equi-probability). For each j, pji = p
j
m, for all i,m ∈ N .
Here, pji is the probability that agent i has utility function U
j . One way to think about
assumption A.4 is that a social planner tasked with deciding the distribution of income
uses the uniform probability distribution over the possible matchings of utility functions to
individuals.
For any income distribution y, let ỹ be a permutation of y such that ỹj is the income of
the individual with the jth utility function. There are n! ways of assigning n utility functions
to n individuals. For each such assignment k, there is a particular permutation vector ỹ(k)
reflecting a particular assignment of utility functions to individuals (or, maybe more carefully,
a matching of incomes with utility functions). So for any income vector y, the n! possible
social welfare values are given by F (ỹ(k)), k = 1, . . . , n!, where F is the reduced or compound
function F (ỹ(k)1, . . . , ỹ(k)n) = W (U1(ỹ(k)1), . . . , Un(ỹ(k)n)) for all y and all k (exploiting
the symmetry of W to order profiles by the utility function index). A social planner facing
the income distribution problem would know, for any given assignment k, that ỹj is the
income going to the person with utility function U j , but not know which individual in the












We can now state (Sen’s version of) Lerner’s theorem.
Theorem 1. Given (A.1), (A.2), (A.3), and (A.4), expected social welfare is maximized by
z, the equal distribution of income.
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As mentioned above, many find A.4 to be unmotivated as a representation of ignorance
about who has which utility function. One attempt to respond to these concerns is to
eschew equating ignorance with any probabilistic judgment whatsoever and to appeal to
some decision theoretic alternative to expected utility theory. In particular, versions of a
theorem to the effect that the equal distribution is a maximin strategy have been proved,
demonstrating that Lerner’s conclusion is not as dependent on A.4 as it might initially appear
(Sen, 1969; McManus et al., 1972; Sen, 1973). The maximin policy is to maximize the
minimum possible level of social welfare, where the possibilities are the assignments of utility
functions to individuals. Dispensing with A.4, Sen makes two further assumptions (1973,
Theorem 2).4
(A.5) (Shared Set of Welfare Functions). For any individual i and any utility function j, it
is possible that i has j.
(A.6) (Bounded Individual Utility Functions). Each function U j is bounded from below.
Theorem 2. Given (A.1), (A.2), (A.3), (A.5), and (A.6), the equal distribution z is the
maximin strategy for social welfare.
As McManus et al. put it, “the worrisome hypothesis of equal probability is not necessary
for Lerner’s conclusion” (1972, p. 494).
However, maximin is itself of questionable normative status. For example, that o2 and
not o1 is the maximin solution in the following decision problem gives some pause about the
general appeal of the rule for decisions under uncertainty (Cf. Luce and Raiffa, 1957, pp.
279–280).
Table 1: A Problem with Maximin
s1 s2 s3 . . . s100
o1 10
−7 1060 1060 . . . 1060
o2 10
−6 10−6 10−6 . . . 10−6
Option o1’s payoff from state 2 on can be increased arbitrarily and option o2’s payoff can be
decreased to any positive number (provided o1’s payoff in s1 is still lower) without altering
maximin’s verdict. Notice, however, that the force of this objection depends heavily on
measurability assumptions about utilities. Still, with no probabilistic assessments of the
states whatsoever, it is, at the very least, extremely difficult to evaluate such choices.
3 Complete Ignorance
The theory of imprecise probabilities has at its disposal the representation of a form of
ignorance more severe than any that admits representation when it is assumed that proba-
bility judgments are numerically precise. There are a number of IP frameworks, but I will
4As Sen observes, assumption A.6 is stronger than he needs. The same is true for the generalizations below.
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work with arbitrary sets of probability functions. In his review of Walley’s treatise on IP,
Wasserman takes note of this “nice feature”: “A nice feature about [IP] is that there exists
a transformation-invariant expression of ignorance, a holy grail in Bayesian statistics. To
represent ignorance, we use the set P of all probabilities” (Wasserman, 1993, p. 701, notation
changed for consistency).5 Many advocates of IP have found the set of all probabilities to
be an eminently natural representation of complete ignorance. Isaac Levi, for example, calls
such a state “probabilistically ignorant in the extreme sense” (1977). Since no probability
distribution is ruled out, P reflects no information about the relevant possibilities.
The primary concern about this proposal for representing ignorance has to do with what
is sometimes called belief inertia (Levi, 1980; Vallinder, 2018; Bradley, 2019). After his
flattering remarks, Wasserman continues, “It is tempting to conclude that this solves the
problem of finding an objective prior for Bayesian inference. But a vacuous prior gives a
vacuous posterior, no matter how much data we obtain. So we cannot represent ignorance
after all, at least not in standard statistical problems [...] What a shame that we cannot drink
from the grail” (1993, p. 701). But belief inertia isn’t the slightest problem for using this
representation of ignorance to carry out an exercise of making hypothetical choices behind
the veil of ignorance.6 There is no concern to learn or update our “initial” ignorance in this
context.
Let Pji be the set of probabilities assigned to individual i having utility U j . I propose to
consider replacing Lerner’s equi-probability assumption A.4 with the following assumption.
(A.7) For each j, Pji = [0, 1] for all i ∈ N .
One way to think about assumption A.7 is that a social planner responsible for the choice
of income distribution uses the same set of probability distributions over the possible utility
functions—the set of all distributions—for each individual. A.7 immediately implies that
Pji = P
j
m for all i,m ∈ N , in analogy to the equi-probability assumption A.4. A.7 also implies
A.5 since, for any utility function j and individual i, Pji includes positive values (even 1) for
the possibility that j belongs to i, which is not the case when it is not possible that i has
j. On the one hand, A.7 is a very weak assumption, too weak, one might think, to derive
something like Lerner’s egalitarian conclusion from. On the other hand, A.7 would seem to
be far less open to the objections leveled against the equi-probability assumption, A.4, as a
representation of ignorance. However, Observations 1 and 2 below show that, together with
the other assumptions discussed, interesting content remains.
We have assumed a fixed, finite set of utility functions—in fact, of the same cardinality
as the population (but see footnote 3). But there could be greater uncertainty about the
appropriate set of possible utility functions. A larger set of possible individual utility functions
would imply a larger set of possible assignments of utility functions to individuals. So, we
5The relevant notion of transformation invariance amounts to the possibility of reparameterizing or re-
describing the space of possibilities without thereby having to alter the probabilities assigned to events, an
issue with which so-called objectivist methods struggle.
6Levi thinks that his concept of confirmational commitment can help to cope with the problem of belief
inertia (1980, §13.2, §13.3). A confirmational commitment is a function from states of full belief or evidence to
sets of probabilities and can be rationally revised under some circumstances, including in the case of ignorance.
Such a theory of the revision of confirmational commitments would entail that being in a state of complete
ignorance at one point does not preclude an agent from making more informative probability judgments in
the future.
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could be confronted with a state of what Leve calls “modal ignorance” that is more severe
than we have assumed (1977). (A smaller set of possible assignments of utility functions to
individuals is also possible—if the social planner knows that one particular utility function
belongs to a particular individual, for example—and would be a less severe state of modal
ignorance than we are assuming.) In such a state of greater modal ignorance, we could
still face probabilistic ignorance regarding the relative likelihoods of the various assignments.
While I will not pursue this issue here, extending Lerner’s theorem to significantly greater
states of modal ignorance may provide for an even more severe and convincing robustness
check on Lerner’s egalitarian argument.7
4 Choice under IP
Part of the debate between Harsanyi and Rawls concerns, not only the form of ignorance faced,
but the appropriate decision rule to use behind the veil of ignorance. Where Harsanyi advo-
cates the maximization of expected utility, making certain assumptions of equi-probability,
Rawls advocates a non-probabilistic rule, maximin, and denies the legitimacy of informa-
tive probabilistic judgments about social standing.8 The mere introduction of IP forms of
ignorance—which are in a sense probabilistic without necessarily being as precise as those
Rawls objects to—does not settle the issue of the appropriate decision criterion with which
to pair such representations, even if we retain a general commitment to the spirit of expected
utility.
There are a number of candidates considered in the literature, each with a claim to
generalize expected utility maximization. Since this is a matter of some controversy, and
the subsequent analysis depends on it, let’s briefly review the primary proposals. Let Y be
a given set of options (for simplicity, I supress reference to a state space here). One of the
more restrictive IP decision rules embodies some of the pessimism of maximin (e.g., Gilboa
and Schmeidler, 1989). Γ-maximin restricts choice to the set{




EUp(y) for all y ∈ Y
}
,
where EUp(x) is the p-expected U -utility of x. (In the context of Lerner’s theorem, we drop
the social welfare function W from our notation and write Ep(x) as in Equation 1.) Another
of the more restrictive IP decision rules is optimistic where Γ-maximin is pessimistic. The
Γ-maximax options of Y are given by the set{




EUp(y) for all y ∈ Y
}
.
E-admissibility, a more liberal rule, was proposed by Isaac Levi (1974). E-admissible options
maximize expected utility relative to some p ∈ P. That is, the E-admissible options are those
in the set {
x ∈ Y : ∃p ∈ P ∀y ∈ Y EUp(x) ≥ EUp(y)
}
.
7Cf. Thistle (2007, fn. 9) on this topic. Thistle demonstrates how Lerner’s theorem can be generalized in
various other ways.
8The maximin principle Ralws favors differs from the one that is the subject of Theorem 2. Rawls’s rule
seeks to maximize the lot of the least well off individual in society. Put another way, social welfare, which we
aim to maximize, is identified with the status of the worst off individual.
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More liberal still, Maximality (Walley, 1991) enjoins us to choose options undominated in
expectation, restricting choice to the set{
x ∈ Y : ∀y ∈ Y ∃p ∈ P EUp(x) ≥ EUp(y)
}
.
Interval Dominance appeals to a weaker notion of avoiding dominated options. Admissible
options according to this rule are those in the set{




EUp(y) for all y ∈ Y
}
.
Γ-maximin, Γ-maximax, E-admissibility, Maximality, and Interval Dominance all generalize
expected utility maximization. When P = {p}, all rules amount to maximizing expected
utility with respect to p. For other discussions of this rule set, see for example (Troffaes,
2007; Chandler, 2014; Huntley et al., 2014). Troffaes establishes that these decision rules
stand in certain logical relations to each other generally, as depicted in Figure 1 (2007,
Theorem 1). An arrow represents the fact that admissibility according to one rule implies
admissibility according to the rule the arrow points to.
Figure 1: Relations among IP Decision Rules
Γ-maximax Γ-maximin
E + Γ E-admissibility Maximality
Interval Dominance
Since E-admissibility is a rather permissive decision rule—Maximality and Interval Domi-
nance even more so—some have considered lexicographic choice procedures that would narrow
the class of admissible options further. One candidate often considered in this context is E-
admissibility + Γ-maximin (abbreviated E + Γ in Figure 1) (Levi, 1986; Seidenfeld et al.,
2012). This rule first restricts choice to E-admissible options, and then applies Γ-maximin
to the set of E-admissible options as a tie-breaking procedure. What are the logical relations
between this rule and those considered above? While the admissibility of an option accord-
ing to E-admissibility + Γ-maximin clearly implies its E-admissibility, it is not true that it
implies the option’s admissibility according to Γ-maximin (e.g., Seidenfeld, 2004, Example
1). The following example demonstrates, among other things, that admissibility according
to Γ-maximax does not imply admissibility according to E-admissibility + Γ-maximin.
Example 1. Let N = {1, 2} and y∗ = $100. Let U1(x) = x and U2(x) =
√
x. Both of these
utility functions are concave (on their domains). Define W (u1, u2) = u1 + u2, where uj is
the utility of the person with the jth utility function. That W is increasing, symmetric, and
concave is easily verified. For each j, let Pji = [0, 1] for all i ∈ N . Consider the distribution
y = (99.75, 0.25). For some p ∈ P, Ep(y) ≈ 10.24, and for another p′ ∈ P, Ep′(y) = 100.25.
For the equal distribution z, Ep(z) ≈ 57.07 for all p ∈ P. 4
8
Two comments on Example 1 are in order. First, distribution y guarantees that z is not
a Γ-maximax option nor uniquely E-admissible.9 The point about Γ-maximax suffices to
establish the last claim of Observation 1 below. The point about the E-admissibility of y
motivates the search for suitable assumptions that allow us to be more discriminating. Some
such assumptions figure into Observation 2 below. Second, as mentioned just above, while
y is a Γ-maximax option, it is not admissible according to E-admissibility + Γ-maximin
since z will eliminate it at the second (Γ-maximin) stage. This helps us to further locate E-
admissibility + Γ-maximin with respect to its logical relations to the other decision criteria.
We can now state our first observation.




3. E-admissibility + Γ-maximin
4. Maximality
5. Interval Dominance.
However, z is not generally a Γ-maximax distribution.
Condition A.2 assumes that social welfare is concave. This is unnecessarily strong for some
of the subclaims of Observation 1. For the claim about Γ-maximin, for instance, it suffices to
assume that social welfare is quasi-concave.10 But I would like to consider strengthening con-
cavity or quasi-concavity to their strict versions for two reasons. First, such a strengthening
has been thought to have important ethical ramifications for social welfare precisely because
of its egalitarian nature. So it is already of theoretical interest here. Second, one might regard
Observation 1 as less than a fully persuasive rational case for equal distribution. That z is ad-
missible does not at all require its ultimate selection. Many other, decidedly non-egalitarian
distributions may likewise be admissible. This is precisely the case in Example 1, where
both the equal distribution and the lopsided (99.75, 0.25) distribution are E-admissible. As
a result, the ethical upshot of Observation 1 is at most that z is permissible, not that it is
ethically mandatory. As we will see, the strengthening has further interesting consequences
in this respect.
Let’s begin with the ethical motivation for strict concavity/quasi-concavity. The following
famous example is due to Diamond (1967), and was originally intended as a criticism of
Harsanyi’s utilitarianism.





(x) = x/2, for example, it is optimal to allocate everything to the individual with U1.
10A function f : S → R defined on a convex subset of a real vector space is called quasi-concave if for all
x, y ∈ S and all λ ∈ [0, 1], f(λx+ (1− λ)y) ≥ min{f(x), f(y)}. And f is strictly quasi-concave if for all x 6= y
and λ ∈ (0, 1), f(λx+ (1− λ)y) > min{f(x), f(y)}.
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Example 2. Let N = {1, 2} and suppose that we have to allocate a single unit of an indivisible
good. Consider the following two policies. The first policy allocates the good to individual
1 for sure. The second policy is to randomize between the allocations (1, 0) and (0, 1), each
with equal probability of being selected. Suppose that U i(1) = 1, U i(0) = 0. If the interests
of individuals 1 and 2 are given equal weight, then society will be indifferent between the two
policies if the group welfare function is linear in individual utilities.11 In defense of social
indifference, one might say that under either policy, a distribution results allocating the good
to just one individual. In criticism of social indifference, one might say that the second policy
gives individual 2 a “fair shake” while the first policy does not (1967, p. 766). The crucial
distinction here is about concern for outcomes alone versus concern for procedure. 4
On the basis of the sort of fairness consideration displayed by the second reaction to Di-
amond’s example—which might be viewed as a concern for equality of opportunity in one
sense—Epstein and Segal construct a theory of social choice that relaxes expected utility at
the social level and imposes a strict preference for randomization in scenarios like the one in
Example 2 (Epstein and Segal, 1992). Their social preferences are strictly quasi-concave. (In
particular, their theory entails that the .50− .50 randomization is preferred to randomizing
with any other probabilities in Example 2.)12 We must note again that the force of Example
2 depends on both measurability and (strong) comparability assumptions about utilities.
In our setting, concavity and quasi-concavity reflect a social aversion to inequality in the
distribution of utilities. Their strict versions reflect a stronger form of such aversion and
rule out more options as inadmissible for social choice, as the following observation attests.
However, most of the IP rules under consideration fail to secure the unique admissibility of
the equal distribution in general—that is, for many sets of utility functions about which a
social planner could be uncertain, z will not be uniquely admissible according to most of the
rules under consideration.
Observation 2. Given (A.1), (A.3), (A.6), (A.7) and modifying (A.2) so that social wel-
fare is strictly quasi-concave (resp. strictly concave), the equal distribution z is uniquely
admissible according to Γ-maximin (resp. E-admissibility + Γ-maximin). However, z gen-
erally fails to be uniquely admissible according to Γ-maximax, E-admissibility, Maximality,
and Interval Dominance.
We see clearly here how, in general, the case for Lerner’s egalitarianism depends delicately
on the IP generalization of expected utility that we adopt. One strategy, not pursued here, is
to find ways to discriminate among the various IP decision criteria in terms of normative at-
tractiveness. Seidenfeld (2004) and Troffaes (2007), for example, both discuss this possibility,
each finding an advantage for E-admissibility. Levi (1980) defends the E-admissibility of an
option as a necessary condition for its rational selection, but thinks further tie-breaking crite-
11Let δi, i = 1, 2 be the (degenerate) lotteries allocating the good to 1 and 2, respectively, with certainty.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s independence axiom implies that δ1 = λδ1 + (1− λ)δ1 ∼ λδ2 + (1− λ)δ1 for
λ ∈ [0, 1], since δ1 ∼ δ2.
12As Sen points out in his debate with Harsanyi, to take Example 2 as motivation for violating independence
in every case is hasty (1977, pp. 297–298). At most, it motivates thinking that independence should sometimes
be violated, not that it should always be. Imposing strict concavity on social welfare, then, requires further
justification. I won’t pursue that issue here. I introduce the strict versions for the sake of the argument: some
people have advocated them and they allow us to establish Lerner’s conclusion for certain decision rules.
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ria like a lexicographic application of Γ-maximin as in the rule E-admissibility + Γ-maximin
are matters of individual discretion.
5 Discussion
Many ethical and political theories make crucial appeals to epistemic states of uncertainty
and ignorance. Appropriate representation of such states, then, is an important issue in
these contexts. This essay is a case study in applying the theory of imprecise probabilities
in the general area of veil-of-ignorance-type arguments. Taking for granted the philosophical
premise of the relevance of ignorance for evaluating issues impartially or fairly, we can perform
a conceptual robustness check on Lerner’s argument for the egalitarian income distribution
by considering other, more plausible representations of “complete ignorance.” There are two
broad types of reactions one might have to the foregoing analysis.
First, one might take the present study as good news for egalitarianism. Observation 1
shows that Lerner’s conclusion regarding the optimality of the egalitarian income distribution
is, in a particular sense, robust to variation between certain important representations of
ignorance. We need not assume “the worrisome hypothesis of equal probability” to reach
the admissibility of the equal distribution of income, but neither need we move to totally
non-probabilistic decision rules and representations of ignorance either as Theorem 2 does.
Even the extremely weak A.7 suffices for the admissibility of the equal distribution for most
rules. However, for some IP choice rules, admissibility is quite a weak notion. In general, it
is much weaker than optimality according to a weak order, for example. It is worth noting,
as Observation 2 does, that the unique admissibility of the equal distribution can be secured
without moving away from the assumption of complete ignorance. This conclusion now
depends both on ethical assumptions about social welfare and on the IP decision rule that
we adopt. But perhaps the ethical assumptions and decision rules that secure uniqueness can
be motivated.13
Second, one might take the present study as bad news for Lerner’s argument. While
Observation 1 shows that the equal distribution is admissible, it is not uniquely admissible
in general. In Example 1, for instance, severely skewed income distributions are also admis-
sible according to several of the generalizations of expected utility under consideration, and
for other sets of utility functions, completely skewed distributions will be admissible. Pre-
theoretic fairness-based considerations to reject a completely skewed income distribution may
militate against an analysis of fairness in terms of admissibility under ignorance. That is, such
observations may well incline some to reject the general decision-making under IP-ignorance
approach to evaluating issues of distributive justice—or even the more general philosophical
premise mentioned at the beginning of this section that gives ignorance a distinguished role
13Such justifications for IP decision rules have important consequences for ethics more generally, outside
of veil of ignorance settings. For example, the problem of cluelessness for consequentialist moral theories
is essentially that we are usually very uncertain about the knock on effects and longterm consequences of
our actions, making the moral assessment of actions much more difficult than is often appreciated. Mogensen
(2020) investigates the issue from the perspective of IP, arguing that his favored rule—Maximality—is unable to
support the positions of longtermists and effective altruists unless the depth of our uncertainty is downplayed.
As explained above, Maximality is a particularly permissive rule, and, as Observation 2 shows, less permissive
rules can lead to decidedly less equivocal conclusions—perhaps even to more ethically attractive ones—even
in the face of complete ignorance.
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in evaluating issues of impartiality and fairness. And while Observation 2 demonstrates that
the unique admissibility of the equal distribution can be secured under certain assumptions
about social welfare for certain IP decision rules, for most of the rules under consideration,
the equal distribution is not uniquely admissible even relative to the stronger egalitarian
assumptions about social welfare made in the observation. The vindication of Lerner’s argu-
ment, on such views, awaits vindication of some set of assumptions that imply that the equal
distribution is uniquely admissible.
This second sort of reaction, in objecting to the admissibility of completely and severely
skewed distributions, makes appeal to a mild procedure-independent notion of fairness. By
contrast, pure procedural justice makes no such appeal, defining any distribution resulting
from a fair procedure as just—like any holdings resulting from a fair gamble. Still other
notions of procedural justice do appeal to independent standards of fairness (e.g., Rawls,
1971, §14). If the IP statement of Lerner’s problem is the more appropriate or compelling
representation of choice under complete ignorance, one consequence of the critique voiced in
the second reaction would seem to be either that unfair distributions can result from this
type of fair procedure—compare well-conducted legal trials that reach a wrong verdict—or
that choice under ignorance is not a fair procedure.14
Appendix
Since W is symmetric, we can set F (ỹ) = W (U1(ỹ1), ..., Un(ỹn)) for any given permutation
ỹ of y. Properties of individual and social welfare, then, imply certain properties of the
reduced function F . For example, in the proof of Observation 2 below, we use the fact that,
when W is assumed to be increasing and strictly quasi-concave and the U j are concave, F is
itself strictly quasi-concave. I sketch the argument for this particular claim here because the
reasoning can be extended to analogous propositions appealed to below.
So suppose that W is increasing and strictly quasi-concave and that individual utility is
concave. The first inequality below uses the facts that the U j are concave and W is increasing,
the second, the fact that W is strictly quasi-concave.
F (λ(ỹ1, ..., ỹn) + (1− λ)(x̃1, ..., x̃n)) = F (λỹ1 + (1− λ)x̃1, ..., λỹn + (1− λ)x̃n)
= W (U1(λỹ1 + (1− λ)x̃1), ..., Un(λỹn + (1− λ)x̃n))
≥W (λU1(ỹ1) + (1− λ)U1(x̃1), ..., λU1(ỹn) + (1− λ)U1(x̃n))
= W (λ(U1(ỹ1), ..., Un(ỹn)) + (1− λ)(U1(x̃1), ..., Un(x̃n)))
> min{W (U1(ỹ1), ..., Un(ỹn)),W (U1(x̃1), ..., Un(x̃n))}
= min{F (ỹ1, ..., ỹn), F (x̃1, ..., x̃n)}
This establishes that F is strictly quasi-concave.
14Thanks to Jean Baccelli, Michael Nielsen, and Ignacio Ojea Quintana for valuable feedback on earlier
drafts of the paper. Thanks to members of the audience at the Memorial Conference in Honor of Isaac Levi at
Columbia University in September 2019 and two anonymous referees for comments that helped to significantly
improve the paper.
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Proof of Observation 1
Proof. We prove the items in order.
1. The equal distribution z is an average of ỹ(k), k = 1, ..., n!. By the quasi-concavity of
social welfare (implied by the stronger A.2),
F (z) ≥ min
k
F (ỹ(k)). (3)
Since z is invariant under permutations, we obtain
min
k
F (z̃(k)) ≥ min
k
F (ỹ(k)). (4)
By A.7, for any y, there is a p ∈ P such that p(arg minF (ỹ(k))) = 1.15 Hence, Ep(y) =
mink F (ỹ(k)). And for any other p ∈ P, Ep(y) is a convex combination with terms at






It follows that z is a Γ-maximin solution.16
2. That z is E-admissible follows from Theorem 1. In particular, A.7 requires that an equi-
probability distribution as dictated by A.4 is in P, guaranteeing the E-admissibility of
z.
3. Immediate from the preceding two claims (Observation 1.1 and 1.2).
4. Any distribution that is E-admissible is of course undominated in expectation (Figure
1). Another way to see the Maximality claim in our setting is that, by A.7, for every
distribution y, there is a p ∈ P such that p(arg minF (ỹ(k)) = 1. Then, Ep(z) = F (z) ≥
Ep(y) = mink F (ỹ(k)) by (3). So, z is admissible according to Maximality.
5. Again, this follows immediately from the foregoing and Figure 1, but we can show the
claim more directly. Since supp∈PEp(z) ≥ infp∈PEp(z), it follows immediately from (5)






Finally, Example 1 suffices to establish that z is not generally a Γ-maximax solution.
15Cf. McManus et al. (1972, p. 495, fn. 8).
16A general relationship between Γ-maximin and maximin options obtains under the assumption of complete
ignorance in the IP sense (e.g., Berger, 1985, p. 216).
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Proof of Observation 2
Proof. The assumptions that individual utilities are concave (A.3) and that W is increasing
and strictly quasi-concave (modified A.2) imply that F is a strictly quasi-concave function.
This, in turn, allows us to promote the inequality in (3) to a strict one for any y 6= z.
F (z) > min
k
F (ỹ(k))
Accordingly, (4) can be strengthened to
min
k









This establishes the unique admissibility of z according to Γ-maximin.
Assuming now that social welfare is strictly concave (which implies that it is strictly
quasi-concave), we have that z is E-admissible by Observation 1.2. The unique admissibility
of z according to E-admissibility + Γ-maximin follows immediately from this fact and z’s
unique admissibility according to Γ-maximin, established just above.
For the claim about the rules for which z is not generally uniquely admissible, by Figure 1,
it suffices to show that, under the stated assumptions, z is not uniquely admissible according
to Γ-maximax for some set of utility functions consistent with the assumptions. From this,
it follows that z is not uniquely admissible according to the other rules downstream in the
figure. To that end, consider again Example 1. Recall n = 2, U1(x) = x and U2(x) =√
x. Both U1 and U2 are concave. But now suppose that W (u1, u2) =
√
u1 + u2. As
defined, W is an increasing (for these utility functions—we could define W piecewise to
preserve its being increasing for negative numbers), symmetric, and strictly concave function
of individual welfare levels. To see this, note that addition is an increasing and concave
function of individual welfare levels and that the square root operation is an increasing and
strictly concave function. By an argument analogous to the one at the beginning of the
Appendix, the composition of those functions, W , is then an increasing and strictly concave
function of individual welfare levels. Moreover, W is invariant under permutations of its
arguments and thus symmetric. Now, consider again the distribution y = (99.75, 0.25). Since
P11 = [0, 1], Ep(y) =
√
99.75 + 0.251/2 ≈ 10.02 for some p ∈ P. However, for all p ∈ P,
Ep(z) =
√
50 + 501/2 ≈ 7.55. Hence, it is not the case that supp∈PEp(z) ≥ supp∈PEp(x) for
all possible distributions x. In other words, z is not admissible according to Γ-maximax—
but (99.75, 0.25) is—and, consequently, not uniquely admissible according to E-admissibility,
Maximality, or Interval Dominance.
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